Uncovering Qilin attack methods exposed through multiple cases

SUMMARY :

The ransomware group Qilin has been highly active in 2025, publishing over 40 victim cases per month on its leak site. Manufacturing, professional services, and wholesale trade are the most affected sectors. Attackers likely originate from Eastern Europe or Russian-speaking regions. They use tools like Cyberduck for data exfiltration and leverage notepad.exe and mspaint.exe to view sensitive information. The attack flow includes initial VPN access, reconnaissance, credential theft, lateral movement, and ransomware deployment. Two encryptors are often used: one spread via PsExec and another targeting network shares. The ransomware encrypts files, deletes backups, and leaves ransom notes. Persistence is achieved through scheduled tasks and registry modifications.

OPENCTI LABELS :

cobalt strike,ransomware,systembc,qilin,manufacturing


AI COMMENTARY :

1. The ransomware group Qilin has emerged as one of the most prolific threats of 2025, with its leak site showcasing over forty victim cases each month. Security teams around the globe are grappling with the sheer volume and speed at which Qilin publishes stolen data. This blog explores the group’s evolving tactics and highlights critical lessons for organizations operating in high-risk sectors.

2. Manufacturing, professional services, and wholesale trade have borne the brunt of Qilin’s activity, reflecting the group’s focus on industries with valuable intellectual property and customer records. In manufacturing environments, production blueprints and operational designs have been siphoned off to pressure victims into ransom payments. Service firms have seen client databases exposed, while wholesale traders face disruptions when price lists and supply agreements are leaked. Understanding these sector-specific impacts is essential for tailoring defenses.

3. Qilin’s attack flow begins with gaining initial VPN access, often through compromised credentials or exploitable gateway vulnerabilities. Once inside the network, operators deploy Cobalt Strike beacons to conduct in-depth reconnaissance. They harvest credentials, frequently leveraging systembc to establish additional footholds. With harvested account details, attackers move laterally using PsExec and other legitimate Windows tools to compromise critical systems before delivering ransomware payloads.

4. Data exfiltration techniques play a pivotal role in Qilin’s strategy. The group often uses Cyberduck to transfer sensitive files to remote storage, ensuring that stolen data can be published even if victims refuse to pay. To preview exfiltrated documents, operators rely on native tools such as notepad.exe and mspaint.exe, minimizing their footprint by avoiding third-party applications that might trigger endpoint alerts.

5. A hallmark of Qilin’s campaigns is the deployment of two distinct encryptors. The first encryptor spreads via PsExec, rapidly locking down critical servers. The second focuses on network shares to cripple backup repositories. After encryption, both tools delete shadow copies and backups before dropping ransom notes demanding payment. This dual encryptor approach maximizes disruption and increases pressure on victims to comply.

6. Persistence mechanisms are implemented throughout the attack lifecycle. Scheduled tasks are created to ensure re-execution of malicious binaries after system reboots, while registry modifications allow Qilin operators to maintain access and push updates to their toolset. These techniques complicate incident response and require thorough remediation to remove hidden backdoors.

7. Analysis of linguistic patterns and operational timings suggests that Qilin’s operators originate from Eastern Europe or Russian-speaking regions. Their consistency in using specific tooling such as SystemBC and the absence of public communication channels beyond their leak site support an attribution hypothesis aligned with other regional ransomware groups. This understanding can assist threat hunters in prioritizing high-confidence indicators of compromise.

8. Defending against Qilin demands a multi-layered approach combining robust VPN hardening, continuous monitoring for unusual Cobalt Strike or SystemBC activity, and rapid restoration capabilities. Organizations should enforce least-privilege access, implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement, and maintain offline backups to thwart the group’s dual encryptor tactics. Timely detection of Cyberduck connections and anomalous use of notepad.exe and mspaint.exe can further alert defenders to in-progress exfiltration. By adopting these measures, companies can reduce their risk of falling victim to Qilin’s ransomware campaigns.


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Uncovering Qilin attack methods exposed through multiple cases