Operation BarrelFire: Targeting Kazakhstan Oil & Gas

SUMMARY :

A threat group dubbed NoisyBear has been targeting Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector since April 2025. The campaign focuses on KazMunaiGas employees, using spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments. The infection chain involves a ZIP file containing a malicious LNK file and decoy document, which downloads a batch script, leading to PowerShell loaders (DOWNSHELL) and ultimately a malicious DLL implant. The threat actor uses various techniques including AMSI bypass, process injection, and reflective DLL loading. Infrastructure analysis reveals the use of sanctioned hosting providers and open-source post-exploitation tools. The group is believed to be of Russian origin based on language artifacts and targeting patterns.

OPENCTI LABELS :

powershell,spear-phishing,central asia,kazakhstan,russian threat actor,dll injection,amsi bypass,oil and gas,downshell


AI COMMENTARY :

1. Operation BarrelFire emerged in April 2025 as a highly targeted cyber espionage campaign against Kazakhstan’s largest oil and gas companies. The threat group, dubbed NoisyBear by security researchers, has focused its efforts on employees at KazMunaiGas through carefully crafted spear-phishing emails. These emails contain malicious ZIP attachments that deliver a deceptive LNK file alongside a legitimate decoy document, creating a convincing ruse to entice victims to open the payload.

2. The infection chain begins when a user executes the LNK file, triggering a download of a batch script that serves as a staging mechanism for further stages. This script fetches a set of PowerShell loaders known as DOWNSHELL, which in turn deploys a malicious DLL implant. By chaining these steps, NoisyBear ensures each stage remains small and stealthy while establishing persistent access to compromised hosts.

3. NoisyBear demonstrates sophisticated avoidance techniques throughout this campaign. The group implements an AMSI bypass to evade built-in PowerShell malware scanning and leverages reflective DLL loading and process injection to hide its implants within legitimate processes. These tactics make detection by traditional antivirus engines and endpoint security solutions particularly challenging, allowing the threat actor to maintain a foothold for extended periods.

4. Infrastructure analysis reveals the use of sanctioned hosting providers in Central Asia as well as servers rented from open-source friendly platforms. These nodes host the batch scripts, PowerShell loaders, and command-and-control channels. The threat actor also employs widely available post-exploitation tools, adapting them to fit their specialized objectives in the oil and gas sector and reduce the cost and complexity of custom development.

5. Indicators of compromise point to a Russian nexus for NoisyBear, with language artifacts in code comments and targeting patterns that align with known Russian threat actor campaigns. The precision of the attacks against strategic energy assets in Kazakhstan underscores a broader geopolitical motive, suggesting long-term intelligence gathering aimed at shaping regional security dynamics.

6. The implications for Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry are significant. Successful intrusions into operational networks could lead to data theft, disruption of critical infrastructure, or even physical outcomes if industrial control systems are targeted next. The campaign highlights the vulnerability of energy supply chains to advanced persistent threats that combine social engineering with cutting-edge malware techniques.

7. To defend against Operation BarrelFire and similar threats, organizations should strengthen email security policies, deploy advanced endpoint detection tools capable of identifying script-based attacks, and implement network segmentation around critical operational systems. Regular user training and phishing simulations can reduce the risk of initial compromise, while threat hunting exercises focused on AMSI bypass and reflective DLL loading behaviors can uncover hidden implants.

8. Operation BarrelFire exemplifies the evolving threat landscape faced by the oil and gas sector in Central Asia. By understanding the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by groups like NoisyBear, security teams can better anticipate adversary moves and fortify defenses against future incursions. Continuous monitoring, proactive threat intelligence sharing, and adaptive security controls will be key to safeguarding vital energy infrastructure from persistent cyber espionage campaigns.


OPEN NETMANAGEIT OPENCTI REPORT LINK!


Use public read only username and password on login page.

NOTE : Use Public READ only user credentials on login page banner.


Operation BarrelFire: Targeting Kazakhstan Oil & Gas