


# NETMANAGEIT

## Intelligence Report

# Analysis of the SoumniBot Android banker



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# Overview

## Description

A new Android banking Trojan called SoumniBot has been discovered targeting Korean users. The malware uses unique obfuscation techniques to evade detection, including exploiting bugs in how the Android manifest file is parsed. Once installed, SoumniBot steals sensitive data like contacts, messages, and banking certificates, and can receive commands from a C2 server.

## Confidence

*This value represents the confidence in the correctness of the data contained within this report.*

100 / 100

# Content

N/A

# Indicator

**Name**

google.kt9.site

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'google.kt9.site']

**Name**

c17d5c8b8b68e6e574688e93b9c80e4cdcb15162614f465be0baecec0f261974

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'c17d5c8b8b68e6e574688e93b9c80e4cdcb15162614f465be0baecec0f261974']

**Name**

999d7c555ea57af64c0cba26a27704ee5229b4151571bb9c12c6aa2089a7a61c

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'999d7c555ea57af64c0cba26a27704ee5229b4151571bb9c12c6aa2089a7a61c']

**Name**

25cd28cbf4886ea29e6c378dbc3b077c2b33a8c58053bbaefb368f4df11529

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'25cd28cbf4886ea29e6c378dbc3b077c2b33a8c58053bbaefb368f4df11529']

# Malware

## Name

SoumniBot

## Name

android



# Intrusion-Set

## Name

SoumniBot

# Attack-Pattern

**Name**

T1056

**ID**

T1056

**Description**

Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).

**Name**

T1555

**ID**

T1555

**Description**

Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.

# Country

## Name

Korea, Republic of

# Sector

**Name**

Finance

**Description**

Public and private entities involved in the allocation of assets and liabilities over space and time.

# Hostname

## Value

google.kt9.site

# StixFile

## Value

c17d5c8b8b68e6e574688e93b9c80e4cdcb15162614f465be0baecec0f261974

999d7c555ea57af64c0cba26a27704ee5229b4151571bb9c12c6aa2089a7a61c

25cd28cbf4886ea29e6c378dbcdc3b077c2b33a8c58053bbaefb368f4df11529

# External References

- 
- <https://securelist.com/soumni-bot-android-banker-obfuscates-app-manifest/112334/>
- 
- <https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/66202dedc08e0a0473dba616>