


# NETMANAGEIT

# Intelligence Report

## Massive utility scam campaign spreads via online ads



# Table of contents

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## Overview

● Description	4
● Confidence	4
● Content	5

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## Entities

● Indicator	6
● Attack-Pattern	17
● Country	20
● Sector	21

---

## Observables

● Domain-Name	22
---------------	----

## External References

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- External References

24

# Overview

## Description

A recent investigation discovered a prolific campaign of fraudulent ads targeting users searching for keywords related to their energy bills. The ads prompt users to call phone numbers that connect them to utility scammers who threaten and extort money. The scam infrastructure includes dozens of domains and hundreds of ads, mainly targeting US mobile users. This scam is widespread, so avoid clicking any search ads related to utilities and be wary of calls demanding immediate payment.

## Confidence

*This value represents the confidence in the correctness of the data contained within this report.*

15 / 100

# Content

N/A

# Indicator

<b>Name</b>
utilityservices.us
<b>Pattern Type</b>
stix
<b>Pattern</b>
[domain-name:value = 'utilityservices.us']
<b>Name</b>
utilitydiscounts.store
<b>Pattern Type</b>
stix
<b>Pattern</b>
[domain-name:value = 'utilitydiscounts.store']
<b>Name</b>
utilitybillspayments.org

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'utilitybillspayments.org']

**Name**

uenergyproviders.store

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'uenergyproviders.store']

**Name**

utilitybillsolution.site

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'utilitybillsolution.site']

**Name**

thepowerpayllc.org

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'thepowerpayllc.org']

**Name**

telecomcredits.us

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'telecomcredits.us']

**Name**

telecombilling.us

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'telecombilling.us']

**Name**

rebornsolutions.co

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'rebornsolutions.co']

**Name**

powerelectricoffers.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'powerelectricoffers.com']

**Name**

qasmic.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'qasmic.com']

**Name**

paysenergy.online

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'paysenergy.online']

**Name**

makeabillpayment.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'makeabillpayment.com']

**Name**

globalenergysolutionz.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'globalenergysolutionz.com']

**Name**

homeutilityservices.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'homeutilityservices.com']

**Name**

energypoweroffer.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'energypoweroffer.com']

**Name**

energypayment.shop

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'energypayment.shop']

**Name**

energyhelpcenter.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'energyhelpcenter.com']

**Name**

energycredits.online

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'energycredits.online']

**Name**

energybilling.net

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'energybilling.net']

**Name**

energybillservice.online

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'energybillservice.online']

**Name**

energpaybill.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'energpaybill.com']

**Name**

electricpowerdeal.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'electricpowerdeal.com']

**Name**

electricenergybundle.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'electricenergybundle.com']

**Name**

electricenergyservice.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'electricenergyservice.com']

**Name**

economical-deals.co

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'economical-deals.co']

**Name**

eco-designs.store

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'eco-designs.store']

**Name**

digitelcare.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'digitelcare.com']

**Name**

citrexsolutions.co

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'citrexsolutions.co']

**Name**

aadigital.online

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'aadigital.online']

**Name**

360billingservices.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = '360billingservices.com']

# Attack-Pattern

Name
System Shutdown/Reboot
ID
T1529
Description
Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via [Network Device CLI]( <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008</a> ) (e.g. `reload`).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery. Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe]( <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002</a> ) or [Inhibit System Recovery]( <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490</a> ), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017) (Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
Name
Valid Accounts
ID

T1078

**Description**

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.(Citation: volexity\_0day\_sophos\_FW) Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence. In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare) The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)

**Name**

Phishing

**ID**

T1566

**Description**

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media

platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008>)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) Victims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., [User Execution](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204>)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)

**Name**

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

**ID**

T1497

**Description**

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497>) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497>) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox. (Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)

# Country

Name
United States

# Sector

Name
Energy
Description
Public and private entities operating to extract, store, transport and process fuel, entities managing energy plants and energy storage and distribution and entities managing fuel waste.

# Domain-Name

Value
utilityservices.us
utilitydiscounts.store
utilitybillspayments.org
utilitybillsolution.site
uenergyproviders.store
thepowerpayllc.org
telecomcredits.us
telecombilling.us
qasmic.com
rebornsolutions.co
powerelectricoffers.com
paysenergy.online
makeabillpayment.com

homeutilityservices.com

globalenergysolutionz.com

energypoweroffer.com

energypayment.shop

energyhelpcenter.com

energycredits.online

energybillservice.online

energybilling.net

energpaybill.com

electricpowerdeal.com

electricenergyservice.com

electricenergybundle.com

economical-deals.co

eco-designs.store

digitelcare.com

citrexsolutions.co

aadigital.online

360billingservices.com

# External References

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- <https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intelligence/2024/02/massive-utility-scam-campaign-spreads-via-online-ads>
  - <https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/65ce4709711708cb4a321e2c>
-