


# NETMANAGEIT

## Intelligence Report

# Malvertisers zoom in on cryptocurrencies and initial access



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# Overview

## Description

During the past month, Malwarebytes have observed an increase in the number of malicious ads on Google searches for “Zoom”, the popular piece of video conferencing software. Threat actors have been alternating between different keywords for software downloads such as “Advanced IP Scanner” or “WinSCP” normally geared towards IT administrators.

## Confidence

*This value represents the confidence in the correctness of the data contained within this report.*

15 / 100

# Content

N/A

# Attack-Pattern

**Name**

Hijack Execution Flow

**ID**

T1574

**Description**

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution. There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.

**Name**

System Binary Proxy Execution

**ID**

T1218

**Description**

Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands. Similarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as `split` to proxy execution of malicious commands.(Citation: split man page)(Citation: GTFOSplit)

**Name**

Stage Capabilities

**ID**

T1608

**Description**

Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities may also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or on Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole)(Citation: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers)(Citation: Netskope GCP Redirection)(Citation: Netskope Cloud Phishing) Staging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to): \* Staging web resources necessary to conduct [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) when a user browses to a site.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) \* Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.(Citation:

Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) \*  
Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable [Ingress  
Tool Transfer](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105>).(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus  
November 2020) \* Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt  
command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002>)) with [Web Protocols](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001>)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)



# Indicator

**Name**

http://windows-rars.shop/bootstrap/Zoom-x64.msix

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://windows-rars.shop/bootstrap/Zoom-x64.msix']

**Name**

putin-777.onelink.me

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'putin-777.onelink.me']

**Name**

notetrest.onelink.me

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'notetrest.onelink.me']

**Name**

zoomus.onelink.me

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'zoomus.onelink.me']

**Name**

desktop-client.onelink.me

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'desktop-client.onelink.me']

**Name**

5b917d04d416cafaf13ed51c40b58dc8b4413483ea3f5406b8348038125cad0b

**Description**

Created by VirusTotal connector as the positive count was >= 10

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'5b917d04d416cafaf13ed51c40b58dc8b4413483ea3f5406b8348038125cad0b']

**Name**

zoromonm.onelink.me

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'zoromonm.onelink.me']

**Name**

slovo-pacana.onelink.me

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'slovo-pacana.onelink.me']

**Name**

z00nn.one-platform-to-connect.group

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'z00nn.one-platform-to-connect.group']

**Name**

http://youstorys.com/fonts/Zoom-x64.msix

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://youstorys.com/fonts/Zoom-x64.msix']

**Name**

462df2e4a633e57de0d5148060543576d7c1165bf90e6aec4183f430d8925a1c

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'462df2e4a633e57de0d5148060543576d7c1165bf90e6aec4183f430d8925a1c']

**Name**

http://scheta.site/apps.store/ZoomInstaller.msix

**Description**

Created by VirusTotal connector as the positive count was >= 10

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://scheta.site/apps.store/ZoomInstaller.msix']

**Name**

arnold.onelink.me

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'arnold.onelink.me']

**Name**

mmozl.onelink.me

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'mmozl.onelink.me']

**Name**

windows-rars.shop

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'windows-rars.shop']

**Name**

zoom-us.tech

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'zoom-us.tech']

**Name**

44cac5bf0bab56b0840bd1c7b95f9c7f5078ff417705eeaf5ea5a2167a81dd5

**Description**

Created by VirusTotal connector as the positive count was >= 10

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'44cac5bf0bab56b0840bd1c7b95f9c7f5078ff417705eeaaf5ea5a2167a81dd5']

**Name**

zoommaster.life

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'zoommaster.life']

**Name**

l.hyros.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'l.hyros.com']

**Name**

winkos.net

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'winkos.net']

**Name**

ntcrgfmmc3.onelink.me

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'ntcrgfmmc3.onelink.me']

**Name**

youstorys.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**



[domain-name:value = 'youstorys.com']

**Name**

zoomnewsonly.site

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'zoomnewsonly.site']

**Name**

http://l.hyros.com/c8KqPHYKdt

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://l.hyros.com/c8KqPHYKdt']

**Name**

http://zoom-us.tech/ZoomInstaller.zip

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://zoom-us.tech/ZoomInstaller.zip']

**Name**

2311foreign.xyz

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = '2311foreign.xyz']

**Name**

apps.store

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'apps.store']

**Name**

aksdquwrqr.onelink.me

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'aksdquwrqr.onelink.me']

**Name**

fd524641d2be705d76feb0453374c5b2ad9582ced4f00bb3722b735401da2762

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'fd524641d2be705d76feb0453374c5b2ad9582ced4f00bb3722b735401da2762']

**Name**

94.131.110.127

**Description**

CC=DE ASN=AS44477 Stark Industries Solutions Ltd

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[ipv4-addr:value = '94.131.110.127']

**Name**

promoapp-zoom.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'promoapp-zoom.com']

**Name**

scheta.site

**Description**

Created by VirusTotal connector as the positive count was >= 10

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'scheta.site']

**Name**

info-zoomapp.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'info-zoomapp.com']

**Name**

30fda67726f77706955f6b52b202452e91d5ff132783854eec63e809061a4b5c

**Description**

Created by VirusTotal connector as the positive count was >= 10

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'30fda67726f77706955f6b52b202452e91d5ff132783854eec63e809061a4b5c']

**Name**

http://winkos.net/ld/zm.tar.gpg

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://winkos.net/ld/zm.tar.gpg']

**Name**

169-zoona32.onelink.me

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = '169-zoona32.onelink.me']

**Name**

dcb80bd21bd6900fe87423d3fb0c49d8f140d5cf5d81b662cd74c22fca622893

**Description**

Created by VirusTotal connector as the positive count was >= 10

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'dcb80bd21bd6900fe87423d3fb0c49d8f140d5cf5d81b662cd74c22fca622893']

**Name**

api.huntingpanel.link

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'api.huntingpanel.link']

# Malware

## Name

Trojan:AndroidOS/FakeBattScar

# Domain-Name

## Value

apps.store

zoomnewsonly.site

zoom-us.tech

scheta.site

youstorys.com

promoapp-zoom.com

windows-rars.shop

info-zoomapp.com

2311foreign.xyz

zoommaster.life

winkos.net



# StixFile

## Value

462df2e4a633e57de0d5148060543576d7c1165bf90e6aec4183f430d8925a1c

44cac5bf0bab56b0840bd1c7b95f9c7f5078ff417705eeaaf5ea5a2167a81dd5

fd524641d2be705d76feb0453374c5b2ad9582ced4f00bb3722b735401da2762

dcb80bd21bd6900fe87423d3fb0c49d8f140d5cf5d81b662cd74c22fca622893

30fda67726f77706955f6b52b202452e91d5ff132783854eec63e809061a4b5c

5b917d04d416cafaf13ed51c40b58dc8b4413483ea3f5406b8348038125cad0b

# Hostname

**Value**

notetrest.onelink.me

zoromonm.onelink.me

aksdquwrqr.onelink.me

putin-777.onelink.me

l.hyros.com

169-zoona32.onelink.me

arnold.onelink.me

slovo-pacana.onelink.me

api.huntingpanel.link

ntcrgfmmc3.onelink.me

zoomus.onelink.me

mmozl.onelink.me

z00nn.one-platform-to-connect.group

desktop-client.onelink.me

# IPv4-Addr

## Value

94.131.110.127

# Url

**Value**

<http://winkos.net/ld/zm.tar.gpg>

<http://youstorys.com/fonts/Zoom-x64.msix>

<http://l.hyros.com/c8KqPHYKdt>

<http://zoom-us.tech/ZoomInstaller.zip>

<http://windows-rars.shop/bootstrap/Zoom-x64.msix>

<http://scheta.site/apps.store/ZoomInstaller.msix>

# External References

- 
- <https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/65817e4c05cbf5d0fa336908>
- 
- <https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intelligence/2023/12/malvertisers-zoom-in-on-cryptocurrencies-and-initial-access>