NETMANAGEIT Intelligence Report The Curious Case of "Monti" Ransomware: A Real-World Doppelganger




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Overview

Description

The "Monti" ransomware group has been identified as a previously unknown threat actor group, according to an analysis by BlackBerry's Incident Response team and security researchers at the University of California, San Francisco.

Confidence

This value represents the confidence in the correctness of the data contained within this report.

15 / 100

Attack-Pattern

Name

OS Credential Dumping

ID

T1003

Description

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information. Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.

Name

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

ID T1547 Description

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on

compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel. Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.

Name
Masquerading
ID
T1036
Description

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names. Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)

Name	
Indicator Removal	
ID	
T1070	
Description	

Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary's actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform. Removal of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.

Name

Data Encrypted for Impact

ID

T1486

Description

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renamed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries may need to first employ other behaviors, such as [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529), in order to unlock and/or gain access to manipulate these files.(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020) In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078),

[OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) Encryption malware may also leverage [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001), such as changing victim wallpapers, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as "print bombing").(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020) In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted. (Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1)

Name
Browser Extensions
ID
T1176

Description

Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions. Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the `profiles` tool to install malicious `.mobileconfig` files. In macOS 11+, the use of the `profiles` tool can no longer install configuration profiles, however `.mobileconfig` files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious

Chrome extensions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware)

Name

Archive Collected Data

ID

T1560

Description

An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.

Name

Obfuscated Files or Information

ID

T1027

Description

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to

open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also use compressed or archived scripts, such as JavaScript. Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/ Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016) Adversaries may also abuse [Command Obfuscation](https:// attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010) to obscure commands executed from payloads or directly via [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ T1059). Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application control mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017)(Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017)

Name Ingress Tool Transfer ID T1105 Description

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570)). Files can also be transferred using various [Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)s as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) On Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such as `copy`, `finger`, [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160), and [PowerShell](https:// attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands such as `IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString()` and `Invoke-WebRequest`. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as `curl`, `scp`, `sftp`, `tftp`, `rsync`, `finger`, and `wget`. (Citation: t1105_lolbas)

Name

Remote Services

ID

T1021

Description

Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) They could also login to accessible SaaS or IaaS services, such as those that federate their identities to the domain. Legitimate applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) for secure file transfer. (Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop) commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop) commands)

Name

Unsecured Credentials

D

T1552

Description

Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).

Name	
Screen Capture	
ID	
T1113	
Description	
Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information	

over the course of an operation. Screen capturies of the desktop to gather mormation over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as `CopyFromScreen`, `xwd`, or `screencapture`.(Citation: CopyFromScreen .NET)(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)

Indicator

Name
dropmefiles.com.ua
Pattern Type
stix
Pattern
[domain-name:value = 'dropmefiles.com.ua']
Name
b45fe91d2e2340939781d39daf606622e6d0b9ddacd8425cb8e49c56124c1d56
Pattern Type
stix
Pattern
[file:hashes.'SHA-256' = 'b45fe91d2e2340939781d39daf606622e6d0b9ddacd8425cb8e49c56124c1d56']
Name

d80db8afc1145d754007c88bac8d8e3e3d8166c4

Description

Detects ChaCha8 encrypted 'MONTI Strain' text (using all-zero key and nonce) embedded in ransomware payload

Pattern Type

yara

Pattern

rule monti_ransom { meta: description = "Detects ChaCha8 encrypted 'MONTI Strain' text (using all-zero key and nonce) embedded in ransomware payload" author = "BlackBerry Threat Research Team" date = "August 15, 2021" license = "This Yara rule is provided under the Apache License 2.0 (https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) and open to any user or organization, as long as you use it under this license and ensure originator credit in any derivative to The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team" strings: \$s = {20 19 57 65 03 62 D0 AE F4 D1 68} condition: uint16be(0) == 0x4d5a and filesize < 2MB and \$s }

Name

702099b63cb2384e11f088d6bc33afbd43a4c91848f393581242a6a17f1b30a0

Pattern Type

stix

Pattern

[file:hashes.'SHA-256' =

'702099b63cb2384e11f088d6bc33afbd43a4c91848f393581242a6a17f1b30a0']

Name

78e2262e21e076818697701fac9a2caad056702f

Description

Detects Veeam credential Dumper

Pattern Type

yara

Pattern

rule veeam_dumper { meta: description = "Detects Veeam credential Dumper" author = "BlackBerry Threat Research Team" date = "August 15, 2021" license = "This Yara rule is provided under the Apache License 2.0 (https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) and open to any user or organization, as long as you use it under this license and ensure originator credit in any derivative to The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team" strings: \$s1 = "SqlCommand" fullword ascii wide \$s2 = "SqlConnection" fullword ascii wide \$s3 = "SqlDataReader" fullword ascii wide \$s4 = "veeamp.exe" fullword ascii wide \$s5 = "veeamp.pdb" fullword ascii wide condition: uint16be(0) == 0x4d5a and filesize < 60KB and 4 of them }

Name

158dcb26239a5db7a0eb67826178f1eaa0852d9d86e59afb86f04e88096a19bc

Pattern Type


stix

Pattern

[file:hashes.'SHA-256' =

'158dcb26239a5db7a0eb67826178f1eaa0852d9d86e59afb86f04e88096a19bc']

Name



[file:hashes.'SHA-256' = '78517fb07ee5292da627c234b26b555413a459f8d7a9641e4a9fcc1099f06a3d']



Intrusion-Set

Name Monti

Malware

Name

Conti

Description

[Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that was first observed in December 2019. [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) has been deployed via [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) and used against major corporations and government agencies, particularly those in North America. As with other ransomware families, actors using [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) steal sensitive files and information from compromised networks, and threaten to publish this data unless the ransom is paid.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)(Citation: Cybleinc Conti January 2020)

Name

Monti



Domain-Name

Value

dropmefiles.com.ua

StixFile

Value

df492b4cc7f644ad3e795155926d1fc8ece7327c0c5c8ea45561f24f5110ce54

b45fe91d2e2340939781d39daf606622e6d0b9ddacd8425cb8e49c56124c1d56

702099b63cb2384e11f088d6bc33afbd43a4c91848f393581242a6a17f1b30a0

9aa1f37517458d635eae4f9b43cb4770880ea0ee171e7e4ad155bbdee0cbe732

158dcb26239a5db7a0eb67826178f1eaa0852d9d86e59afb86f04e88096a19bc

78517fb07ee5292da627c234b26b555413a459f8d7a9641e4a9fcc1099f06a3d

External References

• https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/650da4671f1178374894e4aa

• https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/09/the-curious-case-of-monti-ransomware-a-real-world-doppelganger