




NETMANAGEIT

# Intelligence Report

## SapphireStealer: Open-source information stealer enables credential and data theft



# Table of contents

---

## Overview

- Description 3
- Confidence 3

---

## Entities

- Indicator 4
- Attack-Pattern 13

---

## Observables

- Domain-Name 16
- StixFile 17

---

## External References

- External References 19

# Overview

## Description

Information stealers have become increasingly popular across the threat landscape over the past several years. While these threats have been around for a very long time, Cisco Talos has recently observed an increase in the emergence of new stealers being offered for sale or rent on various underground forums and marketplaces. Stealers are often seen as an attractive option for financially motivated threat actors, as they provide a simple means to compromise and distribute sensitive information and account-related details to adversaries.

## Confidence

*This value represents the confidence in the correctness of the data contained within this report.*

15 / 100

# Indicator

<b>Name</b>
d6900deab788bec8bd5343a64423ebea6b323603c10b3cca03c08ebe0774bb5a
<b>Pattern Type</b>
stix
<b>Pattern</b>
[file:hashes.'SHA-256' = 'd6900deab788bec8bd5343a64423ebea6b323603c10b3cca03c08ebe0774bb5a']
<b>Name</b>
b4872f6bb69b449b9c13ac694a8e54a22dce012cba48a5e8bce0607690d08254
<b>Pattern Type</b>
stix
<b>Pattern</b>
[file:hashes.'SHA-256' = 'b4872f6bb69b449b9c13ac694a8e54a22dce012cba48a5e8bce0607690d08254']
<b>Name</b>

4966faf9e999db2f059162a8d1e17c44d8f77697ec268ff55f2f4efdb96797a8

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'4966faf9e999db2f059162a8d1e17c44d8f77697ec268ff55f2f4efdb96797a8']
```

**Name**

e596b3f12b96bf5526285df19dc9674aaaafeb8375eeac4face8eb4285c63e3b

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'e596b3f12b96bf5526285df19dc9674aaaafeb8375eeac4face8eb4285c63e3b']
```

**Name**

94107e993c42fc6e0634be29191410b50c076e129260d23351baa9f6dc7c883e

**Description**

Win32:PWSX-gen\ [Trj]

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'94107e993c42fc6e0634be29191410b50c076e129260d23351baa9f6dc7c883e']
```

**Name**

0cd26bb7a3a873d60a150ad2e776a37de07f1317639d75f3a0df4939982ac0bf

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'0cd26bb7a3a873d60a150ad2e776a37de07f1317639d75f3a0df4939982ac0bf']
```

**Name**

4ed3e2b343a8bff981a139af0f871bbe76e3e93ac0d6ad4c16acbb1ec0a74bff

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'4ed3e2b343a8bff981a139af0f871bbe76e3e93ac0d6ad4c16acbb1ec0a74bff']
```

**Name**

920a9ec15ffeb5ad880c9368238c3b1ab189d429bd3ef99ac9ab16615eeacedf

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes.'SHA-256' =  
'920a9ec15ffeb5ad880c9368238c3b1ab189d429bd3ef99ac9ab16615eeacedf']
```

**Name**

53c1fca1263a535ac740916a24b28807246a204c6fa22b7374dc17fe913375d4

**Description**

Win64:PWSX-gen\ [Trj]

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes.'SHA-256' =  
'53c1fca1263a535ac740916a24b28807246a204c6fa22b7374dc17fe913375d4']
```

**Name**

2c1c171db85455aa2676e02693c8a9b7d62055fee843a17097dba29915637acf

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'2c1c171db85455aa2676e02693c8a9b7d62055fee843a17097dba29915637acf']

**Name**

8749bc50fc2b1f0a5f7a1c3c1a3132c45c30ba7dc7a849523bb42cf617fc4a65

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'8749bc50fc2b1f0a5f7a1c3c1a3132c45c30ba7dc7a849523bb42cf617fc4a65']

**Name**

40c2f1ee94d5f5283af9b6f7c660aba3921138fc1fcc66dab2489fc9e421589a

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'40c2f1ee94d5f5283af9b6f7c660aba3921138fc1fcc66dab2489fc9e421589a']

**Name**

0e27b766a44e3524aee546e3279bcba22255fa7171b8c6013efa7708e37c633

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes.'SHA-256' =  
'0e27b766a44e3524aee546e3279bcba22255fa7171b8c6013efa7708e37c633']
```

**Name**

d453919141d456afce8476b4af9082b4af8d4c644e8468aa62259d704c22e074

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes.'SHA-256' =  
'd453919141d456afce8476b4af9082b4af8d4c644e8468aa62259d704c22e074']
```

**Name**

e97941f812323e05ba4e83b138e8bb794b88efcd56980d07313b5acc965b2661

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes.'SHA-256' =  
'e97941f812323e05ba4e83b138e8bb794b88efcd56980d07313b5acc965b2661']
```

**Name**

7392019700b493b87ba4a53cc25e7cc639ce58da390b1b3780eaf8ee0889dcf3

**Description**

ConventionEngine\_Term\_Desktop

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'7392019700b493b87ba4a53cc25e7cc639ce58da390b1b3780eaf8ee0889dcf3']
```

**Name**

portfolio-roman.ml

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[domain-name:value = 'portfolio-roman.ml']
```

**Name**

f70651906b9cbf25b3db874e969af7a14caac21bf1db328e4664db54566a15b0

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'f70651906b9cbf25b3db874e969af7a14caac21bf1db328e4664db54566a15b0']
```

**Name**

a00f787d5990ee8303bfd5cdc8eda650317434482e6f82cc53dfcf565006896d

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'a00f787d5990ee8303bfd5cdc8eda650317434482e6f82cc53dfcf565006896d']
```

**Name**

db94c26dc522719a77f7585bff8884400f389dab012a880734bd9dbc3e52d93c

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'db94c26dc522719a77f7585bff8884400f389dab012a880734bd9dbc3e52d93c']
```

**Name**

5d0719c5e29e96b81ec8198e8bba5d531a2dc433c3107be6263dee33b54d578a

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes!SHA-256' =  
'5d0719c5e29e96b81ec8198e8bba5d531a2dc433c3107be6263dee33b54d578a']
```

# Attack-Pattern

Name
TA0037
ID
TA0037
Name
Process Discovery
ID
T1057
Description
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery]( <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057</a> ) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the [Tasklist]( <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057">https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057</a> ) utility via [cmd]( <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106">https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106</a> ) or `Get-Process` via [PowerShell]( <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001</a> ). Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of [Native API]( <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106">https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106</a> ) calls such as `CreateToolhelp32Snapshot`. In Mac and Linux, this is

accomplished with the `ps` command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via /proc. On network devices, [Network Device CLI](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008>) commands such as `show processes` can be used to display current running processes.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: show\_processes\_cisco\_cmd)

**Name**

OS Credential Dumping

**ID**

T1003

**Description**

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](<https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008>) and access restricted information. Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.

**Name**

Multi-Stage Channels

**ID**

T1104

**Description**

Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult. Remote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point

to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features. The different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or [Fallback Channels](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008>) in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.

**Name**

Screen Capture

**ID**

T1113

**Description**

Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as `CopyFromScreen`, `xwd`, or `screencapture`.(Citation: CopyFromScreen .NET)(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)

# Domain-Name

Value
portfolio-roman.ml

# StixFile

Value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e596b3f12b96bf5526285df19dc9674aaaafeb8375eeac4face8eb4285c63e3b

8749bc50fc2b1f0a5f7a1c3c1a3132c45c30ba7dc7a849523bb42cf617fc4a65

a00f787d5990ee8303bfd5cdc8eda650317434482e6f82cc53dfcf565006896d

d6900deab788bec8bd5343a64423ebea6b323603c10b3cca03c08ebe0774bb5a

b4872f6bb69b449b9c13ac694a8e54a22dce012cba48a5e8bce0607690d08254

f70651906b9cbf25b3db874e969af7a14caac21bf1db328e4664db54566a15b0

0cd26bb7a3a873d60a150ad2e776a37de07f1317639d75f3a0df4939982ac0bf

# External References

---

- <https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/64f0afd80b14f8aad315c223>
- <https://blog.talosintelligence.com/sapphirestealer-goes-open-source/>
- <https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/IOCs/blob/main/2023/08/sapphirestealer-goes-open-source.txt>

---