




NETMANAGEIT

# Intelligence Report

## Malicious campaigns target government, military and civilian entities in Ukraine, Poland



# Table of contents

---

## Overview

---

● Description	4
● Confidence	4

---

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## Entities

---

● Indicator	5
● Country	30
● Malware	31
● Attack-Pattern	32
● Sector	38

---

---

## Observables

---

● Domain-Name	39
● StixFile	40
● Hostname	44

---

---

● IPv4-Addr	45
-------------	----

---

## External References

---

● External References	46
-----------------------	----

# Overview

## Description

A threat actor is targeting government and military targets in Ukraine and Poland, Cisco Talos has discovered, as part of a series of operations linked to the Belarusian government, which it believes may be carrying out a sophisticated cyber-attack.

## Confidence

*This value represents the confidence in the correctness of the data contained within this report.*

15 / 100

# Indicator

**Name**

0397c586fa56e672db7f14afa8c19992b6e08ab0c1d282c960df1af26371bd72

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'0397c586fa56e672db7f14afa8c19992b6e08ab0c1d282c960df1af26371bd72']

**Name**

71c0881d35f769fe58c084883d2aaee9ec284fcdc04500e5e5272973dfc78944

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'71c0881d35f769fe58c084883d2aaee9ec284fcdc04500e5e5272973dfc78944']

**Name**

7a9a5317a88afb53b44f6cfed59c48907f63aaa7ef63b1587f990951c423c211

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'7a9a5317a88afb53b44f6cfed59c48907f63aaa7ef63b1587f990951c423c211']

**Name**

4d9cca1d75d4691e794dfe9efb9eef6e9e64b4e978ad17831b459d4bb6722829

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'4d9cca1d75d4691e794dfe9efb9eef6e9e64b4e978ad17831b459d4bb6722829']

**Name**

wordrow.website

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'wordrow.website']

**Name**

924d3589d642e8fd65746dc156ff9f104d43114a04ea9509f51ee6a439d1915b

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'924d3589d642e8fd65746dc156ff9f104d43114a04ea9509f51ee6a439d1915b']

**Name**

1a0e930fbdab2266e14dc501abdbb5623b5762d687df3670d86bb05f252509ac

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'1a0e930fbdab2266e14dc501abdbb5623b5762d687df3670d86bb05f252509ac']

**Name**

40b87c5444e03b6b4f3d38315c1525cedfafc20355fff84502cc594799dc41df

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'40b87c5444e03b6b4f3d38315c1525cedfafc20355fff84502cc594799dc41df']

**Name**

bec98a8a5e6786ef415a7a7bf7e60cbd384d43ede4e882aa560fdbcb24865ac55

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'bec98a8a5e6786ef415a7a7bf7e60cbd384d43ede4e882aa560fdbcb24865ac55']

**Name**

e41b3bdbfb816d5cfd4b235d2b985894153c41da6726ebfa83e45f3b5b4a1945

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'e41b3bdbfb816d5cfd4b235d2b985894153c41da6726ebfa83e45f3b5b4a1945']

**Name**

f00939201f7e77221e94e917a8e34c3d2143324e02fdf35058526d870a0023a0

**Pattern Type**



stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'f00939201f7e77221e94e917a8e34c3d2143324e02fdf35058526d870a0023a0']

**Name**

everything-everywhere.at.ply.gg

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'everything-everywhere.at.ply.gg']

**Name**

7893965d1861c712b751bc2d5fb53a34ec0d276bcf389b7fc574728940575152

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'7893965d1861c712b751bc2d5fb53a34ec0d276bcf389b7fc574728940575152']

**Name**

ce96fe99ebe30ae44e74c22c0b2a055005d0da131e0082a1c290ddeb79dd1114

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'ce96fe99ebe30ae44e74c22c0b2a055005d0da131e0082a1c290ddeb79dd1114']

**Name**

hssenglish.pw

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'hssenglish.pw']

**Name**

sellmyhousequickly.website

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'sellmyhousequickly.website']

**Name**

0f3bdbc64446555c6ff611b02f2e64250fcf39b78237ae4cca7c74d94731b32

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'0f3bdbc64446555c6ff611b02f2e64250fcf39b78237ae4cca7c74d94731b32']

**Name**

c7ec4570524ad59d5bd7a3e8f0d23c8cf05cc0e8a98dcdbec00c9dc075084558

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'c7ec4570524ad59d5bd7a3e8f0d23c8cf05cc0e8a98dcdbec00c9dc075084558']

**Name**

f11310f075171f8502bcd32dcb2fe5894808b17a37f6fd960fb26653871e7b7d

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'f11310f075171f8502bcd32dcb2fe5894808b17a37f6fd960fb26653871e7b7d']

**Name**

a7b7691baa21ad118348661a035b69605a6efd1cd1fa0fd52e5645c64f5f61e6

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'a7b7691baa21ad118348661a035b69605a6efd1cd1fa0fd52e5645c64f5f61e6']

**Name**

carpetmarker.pw

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'carpetmarker.pw']

**Name**

1c118d8fb0be904b129e4552f86cd0b3e239ecd25f4d599c54cc96c1096747af

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'1c118d8fb0be904b129e4552f86cd0b3e239ecd25f4d599c54cc96c1096747af']

**Name**

ellechina.online

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'ellechina.online']

**Name**

991a19fb00cda372dd1ce4a42580dc40872da5c5bfbb34301615f3870ea3fb58

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'991a19fb00cda372dd1ce4a42580dc40872da5c5bfbb34301615f3870ea3fb58']

**Name**

41f050f3d003edd67ec02710c60a7b4022685465cb61ae37fc0b3193c1dab5cb

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' = '41f050f3d003edd67ec02710c60a7b4022685465cb61ae37fc0b3193c1dab5cb']

**Name**

94.131.108.109

**Description**

CC=TR ASN=AS44477 Stark Industries Solutions Ltd

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[ipv4-addr:value = '94.131.108.109']

**Name**

frivol.space

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'frivol.space']

**Name**

7e35ce60d80c85e050133de142a3b261160259846c9c967c7b2bb84923328f8c

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'7e35ce60d80c85e050133de142a3b261160259846c9c967c7b2bb84923328f8c']

**Name**

00030b0db567afa524eb68faf6f194f25bc5361c380599668a82dbae12af088e

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'00030b0db567afa524eb68faf6f194f25bc5361c380599668a82dbae12af088e']

**Name**

ad8e3ebd496fb4d97e5075adb4f2f1b91195cca059800d0acd182a07698c13b6

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'ad8e3ebd496fb4d97e5075adb4f2f1b91195cca059800d0acd182a07698c13b6']

**Name**

6e6f5bebd6bf0fd0b626d6521cdb4faa06275f558bacd419c76702e2728f734c

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'6e6f5bebd6bf0fd0b626d6521cdb4faa06275f558bacd419c76702e2728f734c']

**Name**

simplifymedia.pw

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'simplifymedia.pw']

**Name**

e9bbe7c6705a6f5a78c2a9b8060a7e32374b81058f7c2f24851c4d1ea38d7411

**Pattern Type**

stix



**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'e9bbe7c6705a6f5a78c2a9b8060a7e32374b81058f7c2f24851c4d1ea38d7411']

**Name**

5039d76e697f242c36c5a0ebf7dec127757bc34ddaf33c58251c2798da3ce03e

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'5039d76e697f242c36c5a0ebf7dec127757bc34ddaf33c58251c2798da3ce03e']

**Name**

0f189246247c51a701d5a88a06e1fc4932f333d24d7ff40dc8152ad6224f6ca4

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'0f189246247c51a701d5a88a06e1fc4932f333d24d7ff40dc8152ad6224f6ca4']

**Name**

ourns.space

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'bourns.space']

**Name**

df33b1187c20582560ffaa1c3e86b92003c4a7c8a61acbbe886ab195531c5c89

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'df33b1187c20582560ffaa1c3e86b92003c4a7c8a61acbbe886ab195531c5c89']

**Name**

73a21c1492996794688d9751edd1e5c287da645fa7a960e945bb4ea69855424a

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'73a21c1492996794688d9751edd1e5c287da645fa7a960e945bb4ea69855424a']

**Name**

wuzhenfestival.site

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'wuzhenfestival.site']

**Name**

dd61887d5cdf361a335fec917cd6d1bb186aad56b1f9f5d09b66355ff7f41751

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'dd61887d5cdf361a335fec917cd6d1bb186aad56b1f9f5d09b66355ff7f41751']

**Name**

3670115fa5fac918ad0dafa399568788690f0f205dd0bebe4f55180fd70d36e9

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'3670115fa5fac918ad0dafa399568788690f0f205dd0bebe4f55180fd70d36e9']

**Name**

mingxing.pw

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'mingxing.pw']

**Name**

aea76f905b0169e4289895a8d85980896f802fd18fe246a27d601310bfa5905e

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'aea76f905b0169e4289895a8d85980896f802fd18fe246a27d601310bfa5905e']

**Name**

30d46a740e2677c8fee383c2a4762561a10c66c5b99215262e42bfabf6bfb1aa

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'30d46a740e2677c8fee383c2a4762561a10c66c5b99215262e42bfabf6bfb1aa']

**Name**

2c5ba56a41f40bac2f21065fb9883545ef8d359883cb7bc351c481cb9542e104

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'2c5ba56a41f40bac2f21065fb9883545ef8d359883cb7bc351c481cb9542e104']

**Name**

d3f012662c44293ae07d8c763914db18fc9795673da7c1cdc4d862b1a7c887b9

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'd3f012662c44293ae07d8c763914db18fc9795673da7c1cdc4d862b1a7c887b9']

**Name**

ecafe10f0f7d6a9ae94d9735b45f88492b6ea11ff58f37e62fbf7070778af20a

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'e cafe10f0f7d6a9ae94d9735b45f88492b6ea11ff58f37e62fbf7070778af20a']

**Name**

35d1e819d2ac2535f0aa9e2294570135f37519386872c415e326146e931b8fb9

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'35d1e819d2ac2535f0aa9e2294570135f37519386872c415e326146e931b8fb9']

**Name**

kebhana.site

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'kebhana.site']

**Name**

a7a7c4062ced46275638719c100ea2397c673148e8473e56a3ec4313ca7dc5f9

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'a7a7c4062ced46275638719c100ea2397c673148e8473e56a3ec4313ca7dc5f9']

**Name**

a5fb6b9417e50bd2260afdadb5a9eed33e48a283a51408344a4caa2b1025b9a7

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'a5fb6b9417e50bd2260afdadb5a9eed33e48a283a51408344a4caa2b1025b9a7']

**Name**

a58da0e6a20fed03364a0cbae18008eb4f8d6bee7c9f5e8ffcdac34fb823d363

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'a58da0e6a20fed03364a0cbae18008eb4f8d6bee7c9f5e8ffcdac34fb823d363']

**Name**

6b310bd23806272f6c69b84a0381915f16d705e79ce423f19de940247543c76a

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'6b310bd23806272f6c69b84a0381915f16d705e79ce423f19de940247543c76a']

**Name**

6837c16dce562abf4c55949cfc8d00b019f7fcc6db6a2e9a71d268312fba813e

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'6837c16dce562abf4c55949cfc8d00b019f7fcc6db6a2e9a71d268312fba813e']

**Name**

44fd895174a7c1c0019fc95bb04201106dc165704c70e902e3de58db98f03c7e

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**



[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'44fd895174a7c1c0019fc95bb04201106dc165704c70e902e3de58db98f03c7e']

**Name**

27a061daee3ec9cff928b8152159a472797821834a3aa7639749489b90f703c3

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'27a061daee3ec9cff928b8152159a472797821834a3aa7639749489b90f703c3']

**Name**

5a4bd78a4d3d1a772e9e9b14983646a4c1c6a25cc983b804e4522774ebfa1c14

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'5a4bd78a4d3d1a772e9e9b14983646a4c1c6a25cc983b804e4522774ebfa1c14']

**Name**

5969180b072703709764d1ca40be3eeb40f2eb0090859b3743cc21b884fa2106

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'5969180b072703709764d1ca40be3eeb40f2eb0090859b3743cc21b884fa2106']

**Name**

4da99f963c26bcc4537ba0437c9cc1445be8bea64067d34308dda6c2e49c8c65

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'4da99f963c26bcc4537ba0437c9cc1445be8bea64067d34308dda6c2e49c8c65']

**Name**

onyangdol.site

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'onyangdol.site']

**Name**

c40e6b176ad3fd7332cd217191e557352ef4b82bf91f29939121267598737990

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'c40e6b176ad3fd7332cd217191e557352ef4b82bf91f29939121267598737990']

**Name**

00fdb03518c238dc649a39e94f0bcc95dacf3b832979d14d0ed5194b9b482b87

**Description**

#Lowfi:Lua:Mampa:99!ml

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'00fdb03518c238dc649a39e94f0bcc95dacf3b832979d14d0ed5194b9b482b87']

**Name**

c0c455cd3e18be14d2e34cf4e3fb98e7ab0a75ef04b6049ff9f7b306d62704b8

**Description**

DotNET\_Reactor

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'c0c455cd3e18be14d2e34cf4e3fb98e7ab0a75ef04b6049ff9f7b306d62704b8']

**Name**

4cedec3e1a2f72a917ad9a59ebe116ed50c3268567946d1e493c8163486b888b

**Description**

#Lowfi:Lua:Mampa:99!ml

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'4cedec3e1a2f72a917ad9a59ebe116ed50c3268567946d1e493c8163486b888b']

**Name**

bc92a5b1c4205ea1fbfec9144b8aab485e095142c7105c9d616b089ec668f198

**Description**

SLFPER:MSIL/AsmblyLoadInvoke

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

```
[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'bc92a5b1c4205ea1fbfec9144b8aab485e095142c7105c9d616b089ec668f198']
```

# Country

**Name**

Poland

**Name**

Ukraine

# Malware

## Name

njRAT

## Description

[njRAT](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385>) is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first observed in 2012. It has been used by threat actors in the Middle East.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)

## Name

Cobalt Strike

## Description

[Cobalt Strike](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154>) is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual) In addition to its own capabilities, [Cobalt Strike](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154>) leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and [Mimikatz](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002>).(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)

# Attack-Pattern

**Name**

Office Application Startup

**ID**

T1137

**Description**

Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins. A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)

**Name**

Subvert Trust Controls

**ID**

T1553



**Description**

Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site. Adversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct [File and Directory Permissions Modification](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222>) or [Modify Registry](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112>) in support of subverting these controls. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.(Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)(Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)

**Name**

Hijack Execution Flow

**ID**

T1574

**Description**

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution. There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.

**Name**

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

**ID**

T1547

**Description**

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel. Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.

**Name**

Masquerading

**ID**

T1036

**Description**

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names. Renaming abusible system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036>).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)

**Name**

Phishing

**ID**

T1566

**Description**

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008>)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) Victims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., [User Execution](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204>)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)

**Name**

Obfuscated Files or Information

**ID**

T1027

**Description**

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also use compressed or archived scripts, such as JavaScript. Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016) Adversaries may also abuse [Command Obfuscation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010) to obscure commands executed from payloads or directly via [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application control mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017)(Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017)

**Name**

System Binary Proxy Execution

**ID**

T1218

**Description**

Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that

are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands. Similarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as `split` to proxy execution of malicious commands.(Citation: split man page)(Citation: GTFO split)

# Sector

**Name**

Defense

**Description**

Public and private entities involved in the conception and production of weapons and the planning and conducting of military operations.

**Name**

Defense ministries (including the military)

**Description**

Includes the military and all defense related-space activities.

**Name**

Government and administrations

**Description**

Civilian government institutions and administrations of the executive and legislative branches. The diplomatic and judicial branches are not included.

# Domain-Name

**Value**

hssenglish.pw

sellmyhousequickly.website

ellechina.online

bourns.space

wordrow.website

wuzhenfestival.site

simplifymedia.pw

frivol.space

kebhana.site

carpetmarker.pw

mingxing.pw

onyangdol.site

# StixFile

## Value

a7b7691baa21ad118348661a035b69605a6efd1cd1fa0fd52e5645c64f5f61e6

0f3bdbbc64446555c6ff611b02f2e64250fcdf39b78237ae4cca7c74d94731b32

e41b3bdbfb816d5cfd4b235d2b985894153c41da6726ebfa83e45f3b5b4a1945

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4cedec3e1a2f72a917ad9a59ebe116ed50c3268567946d1e493c8163486b888b

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c0c455cd3e18be14d2e34cf4e3fb98e7ab0a75ef04b6049ff9f7b306d62704b8

**TLP:CLEAR**

bc92a5b1c4205ea1bfec9144b8aab485e095142c7105c9d616b089ec668f198

00fdb03518c238dc649a39e94f0bcc95dacf3b832979d14d0ed5194b9b482b87

# Hostname

**Value**

everything-everywhere.at.ply.gg

# IPv4-Addr

## Value

94.131.108.109

# External References

- 
- <https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/64b04758abb03a6d38607273>

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  - <https://blog.talosintelligence.com/malicious-campaigns-target-entities-in-ukraine-poland/>

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  - <https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Cisco-Talos/IOCs/main/2023/07/malicious-campaigns-target-entities-in-ukraine-poland.txt>