




**NETMANAGEIT**

# Intelligence Report

# Beyond File Search: A Novel Method for Exploiting the "search-ms" URI Protocol Handler



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# Overview

## Description

Researchers have uncovered a novel attack technique leveraging the “search-ms” URI protocol handler

## Confidence

*This value represents the confidence in the correctness of the data contained within this report.*

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# Indicator

**Name**

47097f706f72ac8979bfd846d779f3c520f47241b83563dbbcf0e4df94805a21

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'47097f706f72ac8979bfd846d779f3c520f47241b83563dbbcf0e4df94805a21']

**Name**

[http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\\_4221.html](http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice_4221.html)

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\_4221.html']

**Name**

811bba52ccee8ee0dce9f96f402a7c33427622276028bfb5e9d661130fa0e3fc

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'811bba52ccee8ee0dce9f96f402a7c33427622276028bfb5e9d661130fa0e3fc']

**Name**

a2144301067495656391aaa937e47b27706d7db8ea7fd12412e7796196f91fe8

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'a2144301067495656391aaa937e47b27706d7db8ea7fd12412e7796196f91fe8']

**Name**

cef2c8a040fe4d27843f601b76c13169fcc0f1d5c7f20e71e830967dffa89baa

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'cef2c8a040fe4d27843f601b76c13169fcc0f1d5c7f20e71e830967dffa89baa']

**Name**

c519d06e252a1cf04f8fb38f20c76a39363e51bf31864bac638f662a698b244e

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'c519d06e252a1cf04f8fb38f20c76a39363e51bf31864bac638f662a698b244e']

**Name**

6e7f4d594ee4f5d5f08321ede7c32e51d72acbd0700f37c621f9145d8c86309d

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'6e7f4d594ee4f5d5f08321ede7c32e51d72acbd0700f37c621f9145d8c86309d']

**Name**

fe6a8beb35f9550615cb3190b1b207bbe11c23a16248644c09ba0d007822c132

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'fe6a8beb35f9550615cb3190b1b207bbe11c23a16248644c09ba0d007822c132']

**Name**

b26144c6e42601f1f1be09ece7c7fcb127637db3b953065648d1b1f371da7e8a

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'b26144c6e42601f1f1be09ece7c7fcb127637db3b953065648d1b1f371da7e8a']

**Name**

http://landtours.rs/BB/index.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://landtours.rs/BB/index.html']

**Name**

5be46ac9b6fd4d07db8710315b6fa8597464756005235472cf1562a0398921bf



**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'5be46ac9b6fd4d07db8710315b6fa8597464756005235472cf1562a0398921bf']

**Name**

5b7fdc6714e6e2f7f91a1b895204d630561f1f1431636875f6a270f3db06a55b

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'5b7fdc6714e6e2f7f91a1b895204d630561f1f1431636875f6a270f3db06a55b']

**Name**

437b82a5533485ce26a8b983cffa787e629120422e49b28a2608337158c883fc

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'437b82a5533485ce26a8b983cffa787e629120422e49b28a2608337158c883fc']

**Name**

5c31f5cfa003b1f745eb5019d76aa43f06a7d46c6403eeb2deabd44ee1a1a97a

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'5c31f5cfa003b1f745eb5019d76aa43f06a7d46c6403eeb2deabd44ee1a1a97a']

**Name**

internetshortcuts.link

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'internetshortcuts.link']

**Name**

a3f5a76a50819ed856e22e690989f4e0b1bf6c88bab3d989868700cafa26c4b7

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'a3f5a76a50819ed856e22e690989f4e0b1bf6c88bab3d989868700cafa26c4b7']

**Name**

http://efghij.za.com/Invoice\_898277.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://efghij.za.com/Invoice\_898277.html']

**Name**

http://fashionstylist.za.com/Invoice\_0020317.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://fashionstylist.za.com/Invoice\_0020317.html']

**Name**

388f736c54cb1e57d5877d35da5ecdcf46b88ad2e44ca5d2ecffa0dcf0e1b8d9

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'388f736c54cb1e57d5877d35da5ecdcf46b88ad2e44ca5d2ecffa0dcf0e1b8d9']

**Name**

31038f7ee74463661add7378b26076898e20d19e69f672f829af07b8ff816a9

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'31038f7ee74463661add7378b26076898e20d19e69f672f829af07b8ff816a9']

**Name**

chemaxes.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'chemaxes.com']

**Name**

http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\_6211.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\_6211.html']

**Name**

5d7e304d77bedb970a1c9a5b3aa6f5c4252825c9c0a94fe60ec56a0f1b2664b5

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'5d7e304d77bedb970a1c9a5b3aa6f5c4252825c9c0a94fe60ec56a0f1b2664b5']

**Name**

dd28b5740c0fb2890a7579d75c65cf09a36ba5d9fc5df5c9581771e40420f35b

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'dd28b5740c0fb2890a7579d75c65cf09a36ba5d9fc5df5c9581771e40420f35b']

**Name**

d99ed5b55440cefd33047490937b9b729f6b7a93bcb7d3877d07391fbec2a13a

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'd99ed5b55440cefd33047490937b9b729f6b7a93bcb7d3877d07391fbec2a13a']

**Name**

d6fcf0bcebcac7aa5e7b21b189dbd89f314f79871b770911a7d7b780207fb83d

**Description**

ConventionEngine\_Term\_Desktop

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'd6fcf0bcebcac7aa5e7b21b189dbd89f314f79871b770911a7d7b780207fb83d']

**Name**

964f9489714241afd3c422eb164fe96dfe72c12ab1d3f58613694f73bc7e839e

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'964f9489714241afd3c422eb164fe96dfe72c12ab1d3f58613694f73bc7e839e']

**Name**

de0a1c35121a6e08bf07267aca78fb8fe9c46ead95ed1acebfb3a77b72e869b8

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'de0a1c35121a6e08bf07267aca78fb8fe9c46ead95ed1acebfb3a77b72e869b8']

**Name**

http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice.html']

**Name**

c2f10c9556eecd1ffe67e763190c630262dfdb593245357283b02df2b4d696de

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'c2f10c9556eecd1ffe67e763190c630262dfdb593245357283b02df2b4d696de']

**Name**

http://efghij.za.com/Invoice\_662243.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://efghij.za.com/Invoice\_662243.html']

**Name**

7316651d2e38599d6e46a1ac52dff4eee7ae16f22e87cd244efb9a6ed748f358

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'7316651d2e38599d6e46a1ac52dff4eee7ae16f22e87cd244efb9a6ed748f358']

**Name**

balkancelikdovme.com

**Pattern Type**



stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'balkancelikdovme.com']

**Name**

7a69202cb54dd828736d63dae6b948fcef815658859f1d10220727d242eb6fd4

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'7a69202cb54dd828736d63dae6b948fcef815658859f1d10220727d242eb6fd4']

**Name**

72a79351d602ce6a1d0267bcd6d57c17cd8adc44c78197138cc3be5f4100b5b6

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'72a79351d602ce6a1d0267bcd6d57c17cd8adc44c78197138cc3be5f4100b5b6']

**Name**

b5b3747f8b0d11b5217a7a39c2420fb5a0c1044c82cbe9cba596dacf521a1a01

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'b5b3747f8b0d11b5217a7a39c2420fb5a0c1044c82cbe9cba596dacf521a1a01']

**Name**

19cd76a94c55380cc6b053b05eb8896fa1329f03d65a7937225196c356bb0c6a

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'19cd76a94c55380cc6b053b05eb8896fa1329f03d65a7937225196c356bb0c6a']

**Name**

[http://fashionstylist.za.com/Invoice\\_82637.html](http://fashionstylist.za.com/Invoice_82637.html)

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://fashionstylist.za.com/Invoice\_82637.html']

**Name**

1b004980738e868605f88d6b764f72d0d6c50fddea3a7bdf4508ff3057501562

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'1b004980738e868605f88d6b764f72d0d6c50fddea3a7bdf4508ff3057501562']

**Name**

ea2c8d68c83a93b4f526d2bdb25aa20920b43b7985b9bb8a8109912b74adf1df

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'ea2c8d68c83a93b4f526d2bdb25aa20920b43b7985b9bb8a8109912b74adf1df']

**Name**

ed34e71d2fcae823b130a7e54a4404c15e34060e45c73654d16f34c799f91509

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'ed34e71d2fcae823b130a7e54a4404c15e34060e45c73654d16f34c799f91509']

**Name**

9b5c8b82828c0aa94956671b3b9f2a6ec4f34a642d621938e86bffe9ce8b1acb

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'9b5c8b82828c0aa94956671b3b9f2a6ec4f34a642d621938e86bffe9ce8b1acb']

**Name**

f493a5a65d460bd53b05fde1ee5562db08e52c34989321a9bd09ecc5dc3f4d6d

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'f493a5a65d460bd53b05fde1ee5562db08e52c34989321a9bd09ecc5dc3f4d6d']

**Name**

f4b055a61d096e2f111bdaf7b171719188c02d74fa946dabdae0bbc72671d2db

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'f4b055a61d096e2f111bdaf7b171719188c02d74fa946dabdae0bbc72671d2db']

**Name**

http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\_3221.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\_3221.html']

**Name**

http://internetshortcuts.link/VdXiIRQo/payload.iso

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://internetshortcuts.link/VdXiIRQo/payload.iso']

**Name**

9466d718154c26b8d003b99faff2a8868e2a26788e2946b68245e6dfe54da610

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'9466d718154c26b8d003b99faff2a8868e2a26788e2946b68245e6dfe54da610']

**Name**

a9f132dc514d4598a29d004a38e71d3a389e43b46149a36314d2f55e20e1ebb6

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'a9f132dc514d4598a29d004a38e71d3a389e43b46149a36314d2f55e20e1ebb6']

**Name**

landtours.rs

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'landtours.rs']

**Name**

f0f932c136c2d34b0f9da7a83e1a2f87063ea2bce48d3a9af004189bf49d98d9

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'f0f932c136c2d34b0f9da7a83e1a2f87063ea2bce48d3a9af004189bf49d98d9']

**Name**

ce3cfcc3cd86936aff5d43de6f0298cc8f0c5cf7675d951dd23de53c3b8b154

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'ce3cfcc3cd86936aff5d43de6f0298cc8f0c5cf7675d951dd23de53c3b8b154']

**Name**

c8c5386fef1b6e45e02323f3a45b1e73b5d5be60a8a5f5ebe3b95bce77b03167

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'c8c5386fef1b6e45e02323f3a45b1e73b5d5be60a8a5f5ebe3b95bce77b03167']

**Name**

fc226deb01a8d15acf98fd6e9daa3d95b73687f46e9029523fd7e8fe8ad5fb83

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'fc226deb01a8d15acf98fd6e9daa3d95b73687f46e9029523fd7e8fe8ad5fb83']

**Name**

172.245.244.118

**Description**

\*\*ISP:\*\* ColoCrossing \*\*OS:\*\* None ----- Hostnames: - 172-245-244-118-  
host.colocrossing.com ----- Domains: - colocrossing.com  
----- Services: \*\*79:\*\* ~~~ ~~~ ----- \*\*139:\*\* ~~~  
\x83\x00\x00\x01\x8f ~~~ ----- \*\*445:\*\* ~~~ SMB Status: Authentication: enabled  
SMB Version: 2 Capabilities: raw-mode ~~~ ----- \*\*3306:\*\* ~~~ MariaDB: Error  
Message: Host '224.219.109.218' is not allowed to connect to this MariaDB server Error Code:  
1130 ~~~ ----- \*\*3389:\*\* ~~~ Remote Desktop Protocol  
\x03\x00\x00\x13\x0e\xd0\x00\x00\x124\x00\x03\x00\x08\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00 ;  
Administrator SES ~~~ ----- \*\*5985:\*\* ~~~ HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Content-Type:  
text/html; charset=us-ascii Server: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0 Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 01:58:56  
GMT Connection: close Content-Length: 315 WinRM NTLM Info: OS: Windows Server 2019  
(version 1809) OS Build: 10.0.17763 Target Name: HBHJJDOL-43067 NetBIOS Domain Name:  
HBHJJDOL-43067 NetBIOS Computer Name: HBHJJDOL-43067 DNS Domain Name:  
hbhjjdol-43067 FQDN: hbhjjdol-43067 ~~~ -----



**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[ipv4-addr:value = '172.245.244.118']

**Name**

b8998dff4684d815538b1c57c3bba0f9914f8436fde99ddedc1e9b1e658dabcb

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'b8998dff4684d815538b1c57c3bba0f9914f8436fde99ddedc1e9b1e658dabcb']

**Name**

<http://chemaxes.com/Invoice-Payment.html>

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://chemaxes.com/Invoice-Payment.html']

**Name**

http://bridgefieldapartmentsapp.ie/EX/index.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://bridgefieldapartmentsapp.ie/EX/index.html']

**Name**

2da9b5bef5ced856c6367e990dc2bf0424ad2c551016c3f1d2068b9284310e53

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'2da9b5bef5ced856c6367e990dc2bf0424ad2c551016c3f1d2068b9284310e53']

**Name**

f2c577360fbf36859eeb194970f734810f2954493e5428d71add4edb6c11c4f1

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'f2c577360fbf36859eeb194970f734810f2954493e5428d71add4edb6c11c4f1']

**Name**

540744100c8a0eba6c4d24fcee5df40a274ecd51f33c41e11dbe482bd32d271d

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'540744100c8a0eba6c4d24fcee5df40a274ecd51f33c41e11dbe482bd32d271d']

**Name**

http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\_5221.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\_5221.html']

**Name**

f214a42d57e88b6d77b036934cf93fb9c9126335925bdafc9bb8a326abe2d652

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'f214a42d57e88b6d77b036934cf93fb9c9126335925bdafc9bb8a326abe2d652']

**Name**

485d446c5892b931c0a3a238dca84bebb787052c877deb73f02ae5ee5632de9d

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'485d446c5892b931c0a3a238dca84bebb787052c877deb73f02ae5ee5632de9d']

**Name**

901dd6b7fb5aae90840191eb5e0b8e2578503feaf93fd58b99a3314a2008b4b

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'901dd6b7fb5aae90840191eb5e0b8e2578503feaf93fd58b99a3314a2008b4b']

**Name**

88aeb09dcc59858c9969b7ae1e0e2b58f0aa90b2d27a5edfe9cd82e602ed5952

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'88aeb09dcc59858c9969b7ae1e0e2b58f0aa90b2d27a5edfe9cd82e602ed5952']

**Name**

98ab2fc44063d4e00f221e502419d9cca598fafb9e1e00352149327267604bc1

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'98ab2fc44063d4e00f221e502419d9cca598fafb9e1e00352149327267604bc1']

**Name**

f80caed9f1b4d71e61a2869c240206f55c44fb9075d4da283df0bcedf7a11d3a

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'f80caed9f1b4d71e61a2869c240206f55c44fb9075d4da283df0bcedf7a11d3a']

**Name**

52cebb58ec92cf411ea8482502d8aea3580ded02edc1482609283e0dff541dec

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'52cebb58ec92cf411ea8482502d8aea3580ded02edc1482609283e0dff541dec']

**Name**

a531edd712eb0beabe14cb4e9ff91dc7635b743e71b6fdc20ec4c0247eccff62

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'a531edd712eb0beabe14cb4e9ff91dc7635b743e71b6fdc20ec4c0247eccff62']

**Name**

cargopattern.shop

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'cargopattern.shop']

**Name**

e3d4c11ea01f0b927bac052aa01e246cd2890445d848a7abe4b03882cccaaf7

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'e3d4c11ea01f0b927bac052aa01e246cd2890445d848a7abe4b03882cccaaf7']

**Name**

seductivewomen.co.uk

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'seductivewomen.co.uk']

**Name**

904343ba2502d390b36403181e77192a62f31e98c87eb91906fbae27019b4c0d

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'904343ba2502d390b36403181e77192a62f31e98c87eb91906fbae27019b4c0d']

**Name**

56a2692cbde566ca149ef196f9bf4f843839f36ebfdb8acd47acaf2cd01703e9

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'56a2692cbde566ca149ef196f9bf4f843839f36ebfdb8acd47acaf2cd01703e9']

**Name**

1598486e69f94e221dcbd02b10bb33352baf5886db9c06475470159ab16eadbd

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'1598486e69f94e221dcbd02b10bb33352baf5886db9c06475470159ab16eadbd']

**Name**

<http://cargopattern.shop/page.html>

**Pattern Type**



stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://cargopattern.shop/page.html']

**Name**

http://172.245.244.118/home.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://172.245.244.118/home.html']

**Name**

pdf-readonline.website

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'pdf-readonline.website']

**Name**

c7bdce98567809f96907d5a005ae7ff8295c63b9d93aa2a9846f903d688fd657

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' = 'c7bdce98567809f96907d5a005ae7ff8295c63b9d93aa2a9846f903d688fd657']

**Name**

597f58f1ec035d553dc5f5e9e0d0d0ed656a2488f5f93c30bf528278b3d615a1

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' = '597f58f1ec035d553dc5f5e9e0d0d0ed656a2488f5f93c30bf528278b3d615a1']

**Name**

[http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\\_3211.html](http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice_3211.html)

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\_3211.html']

**Name**

bd33b3aa897df0702913dbecd5ad2f7e63df11f4c2a7e461dad7f89abe218a45

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'bd33b3aa897df0702913dbecd5ad2f7e63df11f4c2a7e461dad7f89abe218a45']

**Name**

b4bded423c23574c5080f449d7c92c95b7aa480fedb756568d7280db3ec80cf0

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'b4bded423c23574c5080f449d7c92c95b7aa480fedb756568d7280db3ec80cf0']

**Name**

http://172.245.244.118/Quote.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://172.245.244.118/Quote.html']

**Name**

http://bridgefieldapartmentsapp.ie/EX

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://bridgefieldapartmentsapp.ie/EX']

**Name**

designwebexpress.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'designwebexpress.com']

**Name**

c1cae7181fab03d16c8e10dbe0993319dca6597e2a2f28ba07014d64f996a1fa

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'c1cae7181fab03d16c8e10dbe0993319dca6597e2a2f28ba07014d64f996a1fa']

**Name**

fad17294a3fd687d75f49040c837af39ca2bb9ea84e022aa750e81ddc4cd1583

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'fad17294a3fd687d75f49040c837af39ca2bb9ea84e022aa750e81ddc4cd1583']

**Name**

http://bridgefielddepartmentsapp.ie/home.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://bridgefielddepartmentsapp.ie/home.html']

**Name**

111.90.150.186

**Description**

Malicious SSL connections

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[ipv4-addr:value = '111.90.150.186']

**Name**

1c450bca78ecf77fc5c9b03ced93f5410f03804fcbf17c9c5e584770eec03403

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'1c450bca78ecf77fc5c9b03ced93f5410f03804fcbf17c9c5e584770eec03403']

**Name**

http://fashionstylist.za.com/Invoice\_898277.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://fashionstylist.za.com/Invoice\_898277.html']

**Name**

http://lfomessi.za.com/home.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://lfomessi.za.com/home.html']

**Name**

923c2a87d2321c3fb172d8998574f4d2695e6c8f5f5d5d568c26aefb5fe2d198

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'923c2a87d2321c3fb172d8998574f4d2695e6c8f5f5d5d568c26aefb5fe2d198']

**Name**

41960d1cd749289ff40a1c92970706ead76f73fb3b61276a2f34a7ac38f989c6

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'41960d1cd749289ff40a1c92970706ead76f73fb3b61276a2f34a7ac38f989c6']

**Name**

79.110.49.162

**Description**

CC=US ASN=AS46308 AS46308

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[ipv4-addr:value = '79.110.49.162']

**Name**

7c1aa45ce5d254ffaefea8396128a55318bf937fbb3400b327f5dc528134730d

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'7c1aa45ce5d254ffaefea8396128a55318bf937fbb3400b327f5dc528134730d']

**Name**

5a47b18066d8dcd0fbc524f529002cf0a270d8394de928e8426fa06959a82704

**Pattern Type**

stix



**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'5a47b18066d8dcd0fbc524f529002cf0a270d8394de928e8426fa06959a82704']

**Name**

40f99a875efa382cc0cae003c7b3b0519a7fcaa10a95989103b1e3e2bb20832a

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'40f99a875efa382cc0cae003c7b3b0519a7fcaa10a95989103b1e3e2bb20832a']

**Name**

188baeb6bf2b009adc2efb648b068be71d5b55d1d11e000c473b429f3dda4a86

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'188baeb6bf2b009adc2efb648b068be71d5b55d1d11e000c473b429f3dda4a86']

**Name**

d9b56c6bf2c52116855a79e0008b6cfd7baef20e5af06ba142f774c8bf3b7401

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'd9b56c6bf2c52116855a79e0008b6cfd7baef20e5af06ba142f774c8bf3b7401']

**Name**

f21010eb8c0f2fd23c4ee941a394853597bfb90527f43f3c61bf6ce004b7f367

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'f21010eb8c0f2fd23c4ee941a394853597bfb90527f43f3c61bf6ce004b7f367']

**Name**

0b28a2dcb365ac02b7d6c3928d5a1cfdd5ed669206eb176ab65ebb6084b58545

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'0b28a2dcb365ac02b7d6c3928d5a1cfdd5ed669206eb176ab65ebb6084b58545']

**Name**

http://www.cttuae.com/ems/page.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://www.cttuae.com/ems/page.html']

**Name**

http://efghij.za.com/Invoice\_72638.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://efghij.za.com/Invoice\_72638.html']

**Name**

3dfc781c1b656925b91a22b48b85b6ce2bf8f9cb9c1288be6ec3b760f6f7402d

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'3dfc781c1b656925b91a22b48b85b6ce2bf8f9cb9c1288be6ec3b760f6f7402d']

**Name**

4f8ba8eec38e117fa323bc24074993a7f1cc31c5ce112f9c6696c724628f53dc

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'4f8ba8eec38e117fa323bc24074993a7f1cc31c5ce112f9c6696c724628f53dc']

**Name**

bridgefieldapartmentsapp.ie

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[domain-name:value = 'bridgefieldapartmentsapp.ie']

**Name**

c91527db707347d7970e8197c8a11446c40d945adfb47eb68f666b02f56d8c22

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'c91527db707347d7970e8197c8a11446c40d945adfb47eb68f666b02f56d8c22']

**Name**

d626716fe7b26f3299438cca864216c3dacadaba145ce2decc2eededb3d4bf38

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'd626716fe7b26f3299438cca864216c3dacadaba145ce2decc2eededb3d4bf38']

**Name**

4daafeb8ae95460be3ef93577983db33cca28ecb67fff9b958a7f71ae17504bf

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'4daafeb8ae95460be3ef93577983db33cca28ecb67fff9b958a7f71ae17504bf']

**Name**

2b84ab32982a3f9cc03dd4f020751dcaaf8ad5ef32d0e7975a0b1d17045ee07e

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'2b84ab32982a3f9cc03dd4f020751dcaaf8ad5ef32d0e7975a0b1d17045ee07e']

**Name**

90202f38f8c813d2e09063432542573e3e7792b9111f2c56d12a451c9dd25b48

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'90202f38f8c813d2e09063432542573e3e7792b9111f2c56d12a451c9dd25b48']

**Name**

d0b0f7842587afe7e23fc0218fd0a391996e72b1a804a6bfc33e97d9aecb6b2e

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'd0b0f7842587afe7e23fc0218fd0a391996e72b1a804a6bfc33e97d9aecb6b2e']

**Name**

6643aba0f5318fe279c1cae871ec32540b65265a68fb98aedae5a6fc0707b3c7

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'6643aba0f5318fe279c1cae871ec32540b65265a68fb98aedae5a6fc0707b3c7']

**Name**

0764a24f94d829a625cca37f92863a84553db77469b68eadf875e73fcf0d3036

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'0764a24f94d829a625cca37f92863a84553db77469b68eadf875e73fcf0d3036']

**Name**

afff3e377a5c13a9707680ed926c15718eeb2d3b4d9dcf0993019b3766fc16aa

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'afff3e377a5c13a9707680ed926c15718eeb2d3b4d9dcf0993019b3766fc16aa']

**Name**

8a22b626a893ed2bcf9f63ffe5dcb2198f7d5dc991b5cec434e8b0f050ebbfefb

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'8a22b626a893ed2bcf9f63ffe5dcb2198f7d5dc991b5cec434e8b0f050ebbfef']

**Name**

9851dbd8a7e9b52e6745b7fb2ff854ce573d4a56be0cd0b700a30eca15e331e5

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'9851dbd8a7e9b52e6745b7fb2ff854ce573d4a56be0cd0b700a30eca15e331e5']

**Name**

15f8dd0880d76be36de65dd8412d7171d2cc00c35d3461452dfdae2f657aaf31

**Pattern Type**



stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'15f8dd0880d76be36de65dd8412d7171d2cc00c35d3461452fdaf2f657aaf31']

**Name**

25f616a8bce8578219bc884a64d1a3bc60ec87f07cdff8da3c386ae5b49445a9

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'25f616a8bce8578219bc884a64d1a3bc60ec87f07cdff8da3c386ae5b49445a9']

**Name**

19e75218473b112e65cec4c2c5afd0c3cc6b4fb8f847127018e0815bd64b6480

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'19e75218473b112e65cec4c2c5afd0c3cc6b4fb8f847127018e0815bd64b6480']

**Name**

www.cttuae.com

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[hostname:value = 'www.cttuae.com']

**Name**

83c8f1d9b27d9e455ad2602b1005f6837ac6040cf61acc3124f7179fd5894d27

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'83c8f1d9b27d9e455ad2602b1005f6837ac6040cf61acc3124f7179fd5894d27']

**Name**

3d87877bfb6da476da1f51410416bef22cc216d941c79268f6de17d8dde1c0b8

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'3d87877bfb6da476da1f51410416bef22cc216d941c79268f6de17d8dde1c0b8']

**Name**

http://seductivewomen.co.uk/invoice44201.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://seductivewomen.co.uk/invoice44201.html']

**Name**

45cd3d4ec91bf68bc975d99d90612e459aeb4a0f31321a440d7d41fcdea798f3

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'45cd3d4ec91bf68bc975d99d90612e459aeb4a0f31321a440d7d41fcdea798f3']

**Name**

4867eebb0f6bca553c7d50e878e3cb19f7471c1c89cbd85f49b6d50f7a44e779

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'4867eebb0f6bca553c7d50e878e3cb19f7471c1c89cbd85f49b6d50f7a44e779']

**Name**

db27ba01238ce49683b68bc9c2b925caac6008ae178d14c0dce4cce161bde746

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'db27ba01238ce49683b68bc9c2b925caac6008ae178d14c0dce4cce161bde746']

**Name**

776d7ce582c1e3af65b60073986c78da394cbbab1bf6b83a6c0d736c58d33758

**Description**

invalid\_trailer\_structure

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'776d7ce582c1e3af65b60073986c78da394cbbab1bf6b83a6c0d736c58d33758']

**Name**

09dc1f4a21f9b36a0ceef791d2bf3463299d172712943139ace33d476d7d7c2

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'09dc1f4a21f9b36a0ceef791d2bf3463299d172712943139ace33d476d7d7c2']

**Name**

http://cargopattern.shop/home/home.html

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[url:value = 'http://cargopattern.shop/home/home.html']

**Name**

bbaf94b8be1c355328e5db962577b26ae73f9c3fbf81e6892019bffbf0513698

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'bbaf94b8be1c355328e5db962577b26ae73f9c3fbf81e6892019bffbf0513698']

**Name**

58addf5e77b1dd45ead377c2a8d52b12a0db4edbc607f17b650c27428e24bbfd

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'58addf5e77b1dd45ead377c2a8d52b12a0db4edbc607f17b650c27428e24bbfd']

**Name**

4d8ff026a14c03fc7fce40fe5bb9c287320f66102693e74e40a48247999f4a0a

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes:'SHA-256' =  
'4d8ff026a14c03fc7fce40fe5bb9c287320f66102693e74e40a48247999f4a0a']

**Name**

84d9b5159f937e5f1c98e221d23546fb38775097e983fb660144b4d4a8955582

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'84d9b5159f937e5f1c98e221d23546fb38775097e983fb660144b4d4a8955582']

**Name**

4c1cb32e0a142d55997a55bfc239e4b5b31a6e021014d023d5ff9787948490df

**Pattern Type**

stix

**Pattern**

[file:hashes!'SHA-256' =  
'4c1cb32e0a142d55997a55bfc239e4b5b31a6e021014d023d5ff9787948490df']

# Attack-Pattern

## Name

Email Accounts

## ID

T1586.002

## Description

Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598>), [Phishing](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566>), or large-scale spam email campaigns. Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship with, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001>)). A variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598>), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials.(Citation: AnonHBGary)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries may target compromising well-known email accounts or domains from which malicious spam or [Phishing](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566>) emails may evade reputation-based email filtering rules. Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest.



**Name**

Gather Victim Identity Information

**ID**

T1589

**Description**

Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598>). Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595>)) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system. (Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001>) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594>)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593>) or [Phishing for Information](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598>)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586>)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566>) or [Valid Accounts](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078>)).

**Name**

Hidden Window

**ID**

T1564.003

**Description**

Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. On Windows, there are a variety of features in scripting languages in Windows, such as [PowerShell](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001>), Jscript, and [Visual Basic] (<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005>) to make windows hidden. One example of this is `powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden``. (Citation: PowerShell About 2019) Similarly, on macOS the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be `apple.awt.UIElement``, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)

**Name**

Regsvr32

**ID**

T1218.010

**Description**

Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32)

This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov) Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015>). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)

**Name**

JavaScript

**ID**

T1059.007

**Description**

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS) JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001>) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScript May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts) JavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple's Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple's OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple's internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002>). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility `osascript`, they can be compiled into applications or script files via `osacompile`, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016) (Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDsec macOS JXA and VSCode) Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189>) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for

adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).

**Name**

Non-Standard Port

**ID**

T1571

**Description**

Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019) or port 587(Citation: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018) as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or middle analysis/parsing of network data. Adversaries may also make changes to victim systems to abuse non-standard ports. For example, Registry keys and other configuration settings can be used to modify protocol and port pairings.(Citation: change\_rdp\_port\_conti)

**Name**

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

**ID**

T1497

**Description**

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned

from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox. (Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)

**Name**

Query Registry

**ID**

T1012

**Description**

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software. The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Information can easily be queried using the [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

**Name**

Process Injection

**ID**

T1055

**Description**

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. There are many different ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities. These implementations exist for every major OS but are typically platform specific. More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.

**Name**

Scheduled Task/Job

**ID**

T1053

**Description**

Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218>), adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process. (Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)

**Name**

Encrypted Channel

**ID**

T1573

**Description**

Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.

**Name**

PowerShell

**ID**

T1059.001

**Description**

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.(Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the ``Start-Process`` cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the ``Invoke-Command`` cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems). PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk. A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363>), [PowerSploit](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194>), [PoshC2](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378>), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack) PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the ``powershell.exe`` binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying

`System.Management.Automation` assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)

**Name**

Malicious File

**ID**

T1204.002

**Description**

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001>). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl. Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036>) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027>) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) While [Malicious File](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002>) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534>).

**Name**

Spearphishing Link

**ID**

T1566.002



**Description**

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an "IDN homograph attack").(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typically with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allowing adversaries to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021)

**Name**

Application Layer Protocol

**ID**

T1071

**Description**

Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including

those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.

**Name**

Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

**ID**

T1140

**Description**

Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027>) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system. One such example is the use of [certutil](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160>) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file.(Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) Another example is using the Windows `copy /b`` command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload.(Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016) Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204>). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)

**Name**

System Information Discovery

**ID**

T1082

**Description**

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082>) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Tools such as [Systeminfo](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096>) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the `systemsetup` configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the `df -aH` command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008>) on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. `show version`). (Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) [System Information Discovery](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082>) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment. (Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine. (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virtual Machine API)

# Domain-Name

## Value

chemaxes.com

seductivewomen.co.uk

landtours.rs

bridgefieldapartmentsapp.ie

internetshortcuts.link

pdf-readonline.website

cargopattern.shop

designwebexpress.com

balkancelikdovme.com

# StixFile

## Value

a3f5a76a50819ed856e22e690989f4e0b1bf6c88bab3d989868700cafa26c4b7

597f58f1ec035d553dc5f5e9e0d0d0ed656a2488f5f93c30bf528278b3d615a1

58addf5e77b1dd45ead377c2a8d52b12a0db4edbc607f17b650c27428e24bbfd

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9b5c8b82828c0aa94956671b3b9f2a6ec4f34a642d621938e86bffe9ce8b1acb

# Hostname

## Value

www.cttuae.com

# IPv4-Addr

**Value**

111.90.150.186

172.245.244.118

79.110.49.162

# Url

## Value

<http://bridgefieldapartmentsapp.ie/EX/index.html>

[http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\\_6211.html](http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice_6211.html)

[http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\\_3211.html](http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice_3211.html)

<http://internetshortcuts.link/VdXiIRQo/payload.iso>

[http://efghij.za.com/Invoice\\_898277.html](http://efghij.za.com/Invoice_898277.html)

<http://bridgefieldapartmentsapp.ie/EX>

<http://172.245.244.118/home.html>

<http://cargopattern.shop/home/home.html>

[http://fashionstylist.za.com/Invoice\\_898277.html](http://fashionstylist.za.com/Invoice_898277.html)

[http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice\\_3221.html](http://designwebexpress.com/Invoice_3221.html)

<http://seductivewomen.co.uk/invoice44201.html>

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